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Foote: Mark v Sabol

DUE PROCESS
U.S. CoNsT. amend V"

No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law....
U.S. CONST. amend.XIV."

No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
orproperty, without due process of law....
N.Y CoNST. art.1, § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
propertywithout due process of law.

COURT OF APPEALS

Mark v. Sabol'
(decided August 31, 1999)
Plaintiffs, children placed in foster homes who were allegedly
abused or neglected after placement,2 filed suit in New York
Supreme Court against welfare officials of the City of New York.
seeking monetary damages for alleged violations of their
procedural and substantive due process rights3 under the

93 N.Y.2d 710, 695 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1999).
2 Numerous state claims were brought by plaintiffs, eleven children, who
allegedly suffered abuse and neglect while placed in foster care or while living
in their private residences. To establish a due process violation, a claim could
only be made by children who were placed in foster care at the time of the
abuse and neglect, and who were owed a duty by the government. Hence,
children whose claims arose out of private family abuse and neglect were not
part of the constitutional claim. See Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 725, 695 N.Y.S.2d
at 737.
3 Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 722, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's
decision upholding the dismissal of the complaint, but allowed for
plaintiffs to amend their constitutional claim5 to allege a violation
of the standard of care put forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Youngberg v. Romeo,6 thereby giving plaintiffs a
substantive due process claim.
The Court of Appeals distinguished between procedural and
substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
by explaining that "procedural due process claims challenge the
procedures used by the government in effecting a deprivation of a
right, whereas substantive due process claims challenge the action
itself."7 Simply put, plaintiffs' procedural due process claims
challenged "how the deprivation was accomplished,"8 and their
substantive due process claims challenged the deprivation itself.9
A procedural due process claim will be recognized when the
government "acts to deny or curtail someone's life, liberty or
property interest and defends its action by asserting that it
employed fair procedures in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental objective."1 The Court of Appeals determined that
in the instant case, the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a
violation of their procedural due process rights because they could
4

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in

pertinent part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. The original complaint was
drafted prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago, discussed infra. See Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 725, 695 N.Y.S.2d at
737.
5

6

7

Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 726, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 738.

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 723, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36.

a Id.
9 Id.

'0Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 723, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (citing Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253 (1984) [pretrial juvenile detention]; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.

480 (1980) [prison to mental hospital transfer]; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979)

[civil commitment].

In Schall, Vitek and Addington, the

government claimed a legitimate governmental interest in taking the
individuals into custody.
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not show that the government's goal was to deny or deprive them
of "safety or entitlements"" without fair process, 2 and that simply
alleging a violation was inadequate."
Under substantive due process, when the government places an
individual in its custody, it is obligated to afford a certain duty of
care and protection, and the nature of the duty owed to the
individual in the government's custody depends upon the type of
custody in which the individual is placed. 4 In determining the
duty owed to the plaintiff foster children, the Court considered
three United States Supreme Court decisions in which the plaintiffs
sought monetary damages for alleged violations of their
substantive due process rights. 5
In Estelle v. Gamble, 6 the Supreme Court determined that, when
an individual in the government's custody is a prisoner, a
substantive due process claim arises when the government
demonstrates "deliberate indifference"' 7 to the prisoner's medical
needs, amounting to an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" ' for Eighth Amendment 9 purposes. However, with respect
to individuals who have been involuntarily civilly committed, the
1"Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 723-724, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
12 Id.
1'

Id.

The Court subsequently affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs'

procedural due process claim. Id.
14 Sabol at 724-25, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
1 id.

429 U.S. 97 (1976). Gamble was a state prisoner who brought suit
against Estelle, the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, alleging
deliberate indifference by prison personnel to Gamble's serious illness or
injury sustained while in the state's custody. Id. at 101-02.
17 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
" Id. The indifference must be that which is "repugnant to the conscience
of mankind."
Therefore, negligence or even medical malpractice is
insufficient simply because the patient is a prisoner. Id. at 105-06.
16

19

U.S. CONST. amend VIII.

The Eighth Amendment provides that

"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. The Court held that Gamble failed to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to his medical needs because he was seen
on seventeen separate occasions by medical personnel over a three month
period, and could only argue that he was inadequately treated, which the Court

felt amounted to malpractice at best. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
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government owes a different degree of care. The Supreme Court,
in Youngberg v. Romeo, 2 held that the "professional judgment ' ' 2'
standard of care is breached when the government substantially
departs from "accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that [it] actually did not base [its]
decision on such a judgment. 22 The Supreme Court distinguished
between the Estelle and Romeo degrees of care, allowing that
individuals "who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to
more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish. '
In DeShaney v. Winnebago,24 the Supreme Court held that a
substantive due process claim for monetary damages could not be
asserted on behalf of a child who suffered harm while in the
custody of his own father, because the due process clause is
designed to protect individuals from being harmed by the state, but
does not generally impose an affirmative obligation on the state to
protect individuals from each other.' The import of DeShaney to
the instant case comes in the form of a footnote in the Supreme
Court's holding, in which the Court stated: "[Hliad the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power removed [the child] from free

457 U.S. 307 (1982). The mother of a mentally impaired individual, who
was involuntarily committed to a state institution, alleged that the institution
20

substantially departed from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards in the care and treatment of her son. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 310.
21

Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321.

The Supreme Court determined that

professional judgment encompasses "professionally acceptable choices," but
did not expressly restrict this standard of care to specific choices a state could
make in exercising its judgment. Id.
22 Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323.
23 Id. at 321-22.
24 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Joshua DeShaney's mother brought suit on his
behalf against the Winnebago County Department of Social Services alleging
that the defendant owed a duty to Joshua to protect him from violence at the
hands of his father while in his father's custody. Id. 489 U.S. at 193.
' DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/20

4

Foote: Mark v Sabol

2000

DUE PROCESS

society and placed him in a home operated by its agents, we might
have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or
26
institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.
The Court, however, "express[ed] no view on the validity of this
analogy."27
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals determined that the
plaintiffs failed in their complaint to meet Estelle's deliberate
indifference standard of care.'
However, the Court found
Romeo's professional judgment standard to be the appropriate one
with regard to substantive due process claims asserted by foster
children." The plaintiffs did not allege a violation under Romeo,
and the Court was unwilling to imply one,3 because the claims of
harm suffered by the children were found to be "very much
' to the many other state and federal claims they
incidental"31
asserted.' Finally, a claim under DeShaney could not be sustained
because the plaintiffs asserted that the government failed to
provide "protective and preventive services to the plaintiffs'
families in order to avoid foster care placement.., or to minimize
their stay in foster care through rehabilitation services,"33 and
DeShaney does not extend "substantive due process rights to foster

26

Id. at 201.

27

Id.

Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 725, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
Id. at 726, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
30 Id. at 726, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
31 Id.
29

3-Id.

33

Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d at 726, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38.
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children ... protective services before placement.., or to family
social services during placement."'
The Court, therefore, affirmed the dismissal of the complaints
and allowed the plaintiffs leave to replead their substantive due
process claims.3 5
CarrieFoote

34

Id.

35Id.
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